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Abstract. While many games were designed for steganography and ro-
bust watermarking, few focused on reversible watermarking. We present a
two-encoder game related to the rate-distortion optimization of content-
adaptive reversible watermarking. In the game, Alice first hides a payload
into a cover. Then, Bob hides another payload into the modified cover.
The embedding strategy of Alice affects the embedding capacity of Bob.
The embedding strategy of Bob may produce data-extraction errors to
Alice. Both want to embed as many pure secret bits as possible, sub-
jected to an upper-bounded distortion. We investigate non-cooperative
game and cooperative game between Alice and Bob. When they cooper-
ate with each other, one may consider them as a whole, i.e., an encoder
uses a cover for data embedding with two times. When they do not co-
operate with each other, the game corresponds to a separable system,
i.e., both want to independently hide a payload within the cover, but re-
covering the cover may need cooperation. We find equilibrium strategies
for both players under constraints.
Keywords: Game theory, reversible data hiding, reversible watermark-
ing, lossless compression, content adaptive.
1 Introduction
Reversible watermarking (RW), also called reversible data hiding (RDH) [1], [2],
enables us to embed a secret payload in a cover. Both the embedded payload and
the original cover content can be perfectly retrieved from the marked content.
RW is helpful in sensitive scenarios requiring no permanent distortion of the
cover such as military communication and multimedia archive management. RW
is fragile, i.e., one will find it is not authentic if the marked data was tampered.
RW can be evaluated by the rate-distortion performance. That is, we always
expect to embed as many message bits as possible for a fixed distortion level. In
other words, we hope to reduce the distortion as much as possible for a payload.
A straightforward idea to achieve reversibility is applying lossless compression
[3], i.e., an encoder selects the noise-like component of the cover such as the
least significant bits (LSBs) of a grayscale image, and then losslessly compress
them to reserve additional space. The secret message will be embedded into the
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reserved space. Though altering the noise-like component does not introduce
noticeable visual artifacts, the pure embedding capacity is limited due to the
low compression rate. To this end, more efficient algorithms such as difference
expansion [1], histogram shifting [2] and their variants [4], [5], [6], are proposed
to enlarge capacity or reduce distortion. We will not review these works since it
is not the main interest of this paper.
Though current advanced RW algorithms differ from lossless compression
intuitively, they are essentially similar to each other. They all aim to find the
compressible component of the cover to carry the secret message. The difference
is, lossless compression considers cover elements as compressible variables, while
the others try to fully exploit the correlations between elements, which can be
regarded as a kind of “semantic lossless compression” [7].
From the theoretical perspective, studying lossless compression based RW
is still desirable, though people have developed a number of new practical algo-
rithms. The theoretical results is helpful to guide or inspire us to design new RW
systems, which has motivated the authors to revisit lossless compression based
RW in this paper. However, different from traditional works, we use game theory
to analyze RW. Unlike previous games designed to robust or saying irreversible
watermarking games [8], [9], [10], in the proposed game, there are two players
named Alice and Bob, both of whom want to embed a different payload into a
specific cover object. It is different from previous practical RW systems, where
only one encoder is considered. We point that, our work actually can generalize
them. The reason is, Alice and Bob could cooperate with each other. In this way,
one may consider Alice and Bob as a whole, indicating that, an encoder will use
a cover for data embedding with two times, which corresponds to multi-layer
embedding. When they do not cooperate with each other, the game between Al-
ice and Bob actually corresponds to a separable RW system, i.e., both want to
independently hide a payload within the cover, but recovering the cover may
need cooperation.
The rest are organized as follows. In Section 2, we review prior arts. In Section
3, we introduce the basic setup of our game model. In Section 4, we analyze the
non-cooperative game between Alice and Bob, followed by the cooperative game
in Section 5. We conclude this work in Section 6.
2 Prior Arts
Though steganography should be distinguished from watermarking, they are
correlated to each other. The first work combining game theory and steganog-
raphy was probably proposed by Ettinger [8]. In the work, a zero-sum game
between the data hider and the attacker was presented, for which the equilib-
rium is such a strategy profile that none of the two players wants to profit from
adjusting two different partial strategies, for a fixed strategy of the opponent.
Moulin and O’Sullivan [9] characterized the watermarking codes as a capacity
game between the data hider and the attacker, in which two models, i.e., private
game and public game, of watermarking systems were presented. Baruch and
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Merhav [10] investigated the capacity and error exponents games of private wa-
termarking games, where the attack channel is completely general and unknown
to the hider and receiver.
Cohen and Lapidoth [11] derived a coding capacity formula of the watermark-
ing game for a Gaussian covertext and squared-error distortions. They showed
that the capacities of the public and private watermarking are the same, which
is in some analogy to Costa’s result [12] on channel coding with side information
under the Gaussian quadratic regime. Baruch and Merhav [13] extended the
public game [9] by dropping the assumptions that the receiver knows the attack
channel and that this channel is memoryless or blockwise memoryless.
Ker [14] introduced a threshold game to batch steganography [15], in which
a steganographer should decide how to distribute a payload into multiple pieces
each embedded into a selective cover. The result indicated that, the optimal
strategy of the steganographer is likely to be extreme concentration of the pay-
load into as few as covers as possible, or the payload is spread as thinly as
possible.
Scho¨ttle and Bo¨hme [16] defined the heterogeneity as a necessary condition
for adaptive steganography, and presented a game-theoretic model for the whole
steganographic process including cover generation, adaptive embedding, and a
detector which anticipates the adaptivity. Though the model exhibited a unique
equilibrium in mixed strategies, it investigated a cover model with only two
locations. To this end, Scho¨ttle and Bo¨hme [17] further extended the model
from the very artificial case to covers sized n. Their results are constructive in
sense that an equilibrium can be efficiently found for any vector of predictability.
More games designed for adaptive steganography can be found in [18], [19], [20].
3 Game Setup
3.1 Description of the Cover
The cover to be embedded is written as X = (x1,x2, ...,xl), where xi = {xi,j}nj=1
represents a binary sequence with the distribution pi,1 =
∑n
j=1 xi,j/n and pi,0 =
1− pi,1. It is assumed that, for any i 6= j, there has no intersection between xi
and xj . We point that, the term ‘cover’ here actually means the data-embedding
channel. For example, if we use the LSBs of an image for data embedding, we can
separate the LSB plane from the image, and divide it into disjoint bit-vectors
to constitute X. On the one hand, such definition has good generalization for
lossless compression based reversible watermarking. On the other hand, it allows
us to well model the rate-distortion game between two encoders latter.
3.2 Rate-distortion Game between Two Players
In RW, to achieve superior rate-distortion performance, it is generally required
that, the secret bits should be preferentially embedded in the smooth area of
the cover, rather than the complex one. Since we use binary sequences here,
4 Hanzhou Wu and Xinpeng Zhang
the smoothness of a binary sequence is defined as the information entropy.
The smaller the entropy, the more the embeddable bits, implying better rate-
distortion performance. We define the smoothness of xi as H(pi), where pi =
min{pi,0, pi,1} ≤ 12 , and
H(pi) = −pi · log2(pi)− (1− pi) · log2(1− pi)
means the binary entropy. Without the loss of generality, we assume that
H(p1) ≤ H(p2) ≤ ... ≤ H(pl),
meaning that, xi is more suitable for data embedding than xj , for any i < j.
Suppose that, there are two players Alice and Bob, both expecting to hide a
payload within X. Alice first hides a payload by modifying the bits throughout
X under the constraint that the total amount of distortion is no more than d. A
strategy for Alice is an l-tuple of probabilities (s1, s2, ..., sl), where si ∈ [0, 1],∀i ∈
[1, l]. It indicates that, for each i ∈ [1, l], Alice chooses si × 100% pixels from xi
with a secret key and losslessly compress the bits. These bit-positions will carry
the compressed code and the secret payload.
The resulting data Y will be sent to Bob, who embeds another payload into
Y by the same means subjected to d as well, resulting in another marked data
Z. A strategy for Bob is therefore another l-tuple of probabilities (t1, t2, ..., tl).
Though both strategies are real vectors, the number of bit-positions is an integer.
We use real numbers for better analysis.
With Z, Bob can directly retrieve the hidden data and his compressed code.
However, Alice should correct the errors produced by Bob after data extraction.
For Alice, the compressed code for xi requires nsiH(pi) bits. Since the channel
capacity for a binary symmetric channel with bit error probability p is 1−H(p),
the size of embeddable payload of xi in bits for Alice is therefore
Ai(si, ti) = nsi
(
1−H( ti
2
)−H(pi)
)
. (1)
The size of embeddable payload of xi in bits for Bob is
Bi(si, ti) = nti
(
1−H(pi + si
2
− pisi)
)
. (2)
For maximizing the embedding capacity, a strategy profile (s, t) = (s1, s2, ..., sl;
t1, t2, ..., tl) for Alice gives a payoff
PA(s, t) =
l∑
i=1
Ai(si, ti), (3)
and the payoff for Bob is
PB(s, t) =
l∑
i=1
Bi(si, ti). (4)
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It can be easily proved that
PA(s, t) ≤
l∑
i=1
nsi (1−H(pi))
and PB(s, t) ≤
l∑
i=1
nti (1−H(pi)) .
(5)
Both want to maximize their own payoff, while subjected to a bounded dis-
tortion. Since data embedding in smooth area gives a larger capacity, intuitively,
both will absolutely embed their own payload into xi with a small index (if there
has no opponent). Thus, when introducing competition, as limited and precious
resource, the cost of data embedding in xi will be surely higher than that of xj ,
for any i < j for both players. Let ρ(xi) denote the cost (distortion) of flipping
any individual bit in xi. It can be therefore assumed that,
ρ(xi) ≥ ρ(xi+1),∀i ∈ [1, l − 1], (6)
i.e.,
ρ(xi) ∝ 1
H(pi)
,∀i ∈ [1, l]. (7)
We limit us to additive distortion. Namely, we have
DA(s) =
l∑
i=1
nsi
2
ρ(xi) ≤ d, (8)
and
DB(t) =
l∑
i=1
nti
2
ρ(xi) ≤ d. (9)
By using different ρ, sophisticated models of the effects of modifying X may
be accommodated in this game. It is pointed that, though there has an embed-
ding order for two players, they both know complete information about the game
except the data-embedding key held by the opponent.
4 Non-cooperative Game
When Alice and Bob do not cooperate with each other, an equilibrium is a profile
(s∗, t∗) = (s∗1, s
∗
2, ..., s
∗
l ; t
∗
1, t
∗
2, ..., t
∗
l ) that
PA(s, t
∗) ≤ PA(s∗, t∗), (10)
and
PB(s
∗, t) ≤ PB(s∗, t∗). (11)
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Fig. 1. Payoffs (divided by n) due to different pmax. left: p1 = 0.005, right: p1 = 0.05.
4.1 Case l = 1
We first analyze the case l = 1. It can be easily obtained from Eq. (8, 9) that
s1 ≤ pmax = min{1, 2d
nρ(x1)
} and t1 ≤ pmax. (12)
It is observed from Eq. (2) that, no matter what strategy Alice takes, Bob
will always choose t1 = pmax since it achieves the maximum payoff. For a fixed
t1, the optimal response for Alice will be s1 = pmax. Therefore, the equilibrium
is uniquely (s∗, t∗) = (pmax, pmax). Fig. 1 shows the equilibrium payoffs due to
different pmax. It is observed that, the payoff of Bob is never less than Alice.
Since Alice needs correct errors produced by Bob, when the distortion threshold
is larger than a threshold (which allows Bob to produce more errors), Alice
may not embed any extra bits (i.e., the payoff is negative), e.g., in Fig. 1, when
pmax > 0.75 for the left case, Alice cannot embed a pure payload.
4.2 Case l = 2
Let Ti = 1−H( ti2 )−H(pi) and Si = 1−H(pi + si2 − pisi), we have
PA(s, t) =
l∑
i=1
nsiTi and PB(s, t) =
l∑
i=1
ntiSi. (13)
Neither Alice or Bob wants to deviate from an equilibrium. In case l = 2, to
find an equilibrium, we must insure that Bob does not profit from readjusting
t1 and t2 for a fixed s. Similarly, Alice does not profit from readjusting s1 and
s2 for a fixed t. Therefore we have
∂PB(s, t)
∂ti
(t∗i ) = 0 and
∂PA(s, t)
∂si
(s∗i ) = 0,∀i ∈ {1, 2}, (14)
from which we can obtain
S1
S2
=
T1
T2
=
ρ(x1)
ρ(x2)
. (15)
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Fig. 2. An example of equilibrium in case l = 2: p1 = 0.005, p2 = 0.05,
ρ(x1)
ρ(x2)
= 2.
When ρ(x1)ρ(x2) is specified at the very beginning, it is straightforward to draw
out all strategy profiles meeting Eq. (15). For the ‘sub-cover’ xi, let d
A
i and d
B
i
be the bounded distortion for both players, i.e.,
nsi
2
ρ(xi) ≤ dAi and
nti
2
ρ(xi) ≤ dBi . (16)
The optimal ‘sub-strategy’ profile is therefore determined as (min{1, 2dAinρ(xi)},
min{1, 2dBinρ(xi)}). It implies that, the optimal response for an individual player
is only dependent of his or her own distortion distribution. And, the distortion
upper-bound itself for a sub-cover gives the maximum ‘sub-payoff’. It can be
derived that, (s∗, t∗) can be determined by moving a specified initial strategy
profile towards the corresponding direction until the distortion bound is reached.
We take Fig. 2 for example, where p1 = 0.005, p2 = 0.05,
ρ(x1)
ρ(x2)
= 2. The left
draws out all strategies that meet Eq. (15). It reduces the raw strategy space
for determining the final equilibrium. By sampling a set of points with a small
step (in our simulation, we set its value as 0.1 × 103) on both curves, we can
produce two strategy sequences, each element in which can be orderly indexed
by a value. Thus, we can draw out all strategy profiles as the right figure shown
in Fig. 2. It is observed that, fixing the strategy of either player, the payoff curve
of the other player is a strictly monotone increasing function. It means that, the
equilibrium will be such a strategy profile that maximizes the distortion, which
can be determined during the process of moving from a start point to the end
point, as shown in the left. Notice that, we always force Bob to allow Alice to
embed a non-negative pure payload in arbitrary sub-cover; otherwise, the game
is unfair to Alice. Namely, it is always required that
1−H(t∗i /2) ≥ H(pi),∀i ∈ [1, l]. (17)
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4.3 Case l > 2
Similarly, in case l > 2, neither Alice or Bob deviates from an equilibrium. We
fix all components of t except for tj and tk (j 6= k), and distribute the distortion
dj,kB = d−
∑
i6=j,k
nti
2
ρ(xi) (18)
between these two components. Let
Bj,k(tj) = ntjSj + ntkSk = ntjSj +
2dj,kB − ntjρ(xj)
ρ(xk)
Sk. (19)
To find an equilibrium, we must insure that Bob does not profit from read-
justing tj and tk for a fixed s. Therefore we have
∂Bj,k
∂tj
(t∗j ) = 0 (20)
for an equilibrium t∗j . We continue to fix all the components of s except for sj
and sk where 1 ≤ j < k ≤ l, and distribute the remaining distortion
dj,kA = d−
∑
i 6=j,k
nsi
2
ρ(xi) (21)
between these two components. Let
Aj,k(sj) = nsjTj + nskTk = nsjTj +
2dj,kA − nsjρ(xj)
ρ(xk)
Tk. (22)
Since Alice does not profit from readjusting sj and sk, we have
∂Aj,k
∂sj
(s∗j ) = 0 (23)
for an equilibrium s∗j . Thus, according to Eq. (20, 23), we have
Sj
Sk
=
Tj
Tk
=
ρ(xj)
ρ(xk)
≥ 1,∀j < k. (24)
Suppose that, S1 = α ∈ [0, 1] and T1 = β ∈ [0, 1], we have
Si =
ρ(xi)
ρ(x1)
α and Ti =
ρ(xi)
ρ(x1)
β. (25)
It can be inferred that, the equilibrium (s∗, t∗) should correspond to such a
pair (α∗, β∗) ∈ [0, 1]2 that,
s∗i =
H−1 (1− α∗ρ(xi)/ρ(x1))− pi
1/2− pi , (26)
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t∗i = 2H
−1 (1−H(pi)− β∗ρ(xi)/ρ(x1)) , (27)
and
l∑
i=1
ns∗i
2
ρ(xi) =
l∑
i=1
nt∗i
2
ρ(xi) = d. (28)
which can be effectively solved by binary search since the data-embedding dis-
tortion functions for both players are strictly monotone w.r.t. (α, β). Notice that,
the binary search operation is used twice for determining s∗ and t∗ respectively.
5 Cooperative Game
When Alice and Bob cooperate with each other, the payoff can be rewritten as
P (s, t) = min {PA(s, t), PB(s, t)} , (29)
for which an equilibrium is such a pair (s∗, t∗) that preferentially meets:
max {P (s∗, t), P (s, t∗)} ≤ P (s∗, t∗) (30)
and then meets:
max {PA(s∗, t), PB(s, t∗)} ≤ max {PA(s∗, t∗), PB(s∗, t∗)} . (31)
Unlike other cooperative games, to find the equilibrium, we have to consider
the side information shared between Alice and Bob. That is, we have to analyze
two situations below:
– Case 1: They share the key of choosing the bit-positions to be embedded.
– Case 2: They do not share the key mentioned above.
Case 1 corresponds to the double embedding strategy commonly used in RW.
In this case, we can consider Alice and Bob as a whole. When Alice chooses nsi
positions in xi, Bob can use the rest positions. We thus have si+ti ≤ 1,∀i ∈ [1, l].
It indicates that, Bob will not produce extraction errors. Therefore,
P (s, t) =
l∑
i=1
n ·min{si, ti} · (1−H(pi))
≤
l∑
i=1
n · si + ti
2
· (1−H(pi)) ,
(32)
which allows
d ≤ dmax =
l∑
i=1
n
2
ρ(xi). (33)
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It can be then inferred that, s∗ = t∗ = (w
∗
1
2 ,
w∗2
2 , ...,
w∗l
2 ) will be an equilibrium.
To this end, we have to solve the following task:
P (s∗, t∗) = max
w
l∑
i=1
n
wi
2
(1−H(pi)) (34)
subjected to w ∈ [0, 1]l and
l∑
i=1
n
wi
4
ρ(xi) ≤ d. (35)
This is a classical linear programming problem, which can be solved by sim-
plex algorithm. Accordingly, an equilibrium w∗ can be determined as a vertex
of the corresponding high-dimensional polytope. Actually, when Alice and Bob
share the secret key of choosing the bit-positions to be embedded, they can be
considered as a whole. That means, for a strategy profile (s, t), essentially, it
requires us to randomly choose (si+ ti)×100% of the bit-positions of xi for data
embedding for all 1 ≤ i ≤ l. Thus, we only need consider one encoder. In this
way, we can rewrite the payoff as:
P (w) =
l∑
i=1
nwi (1−H(pi)) , (36)
where w ∈ [0, 1]l indicates the strategy. It is required that:
l∑
i=1
n
wi
2
ρ(xi) ≤ d. (37)
Obviously, maximizing P (w) subjected to Eq. (37) is equivalent to solving
Eq. (34). It is true for Case 2 that,
P (s∗, t∗) ≤
l∑
i=1
n (1−H(pi)) , (38)
which allows that
d ≤
l∑
i=1
n
2
ρ(xi). (39)
Neither Alice or Bob deviates from an equilibrium. It is inferred that, the
equilibrium (s∗, t∗) should be corresponding to such a pair (α∗, β∗) ∈ [0, 1]2 that,
s∗i =
H−1(1−α∗ρ(xi)/ρ(x1))−pi
1/2−pi and t
∗
i = 2H
−1 (1−H(pi)− β∗ρ(xi)/ρ(x1)), where
l∑
i=1
ns∗i
2
ρ(xi) ≤ d and
l∑
i=1
nt∗i
2
ρ(xi) ≤ d. (40)
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This can be effectively solved by triple search1 or gradient descent since Eq.
(29, 30, 31) show a concave payoff function. Notice that, here, we do not require
that both Alice and Bob introduce the maximum distortion d.
6 Conclusion
We present game-theoretic analysis to content-adaptive reversible watermark-
ing. Different from games designed for steganography and robust watermarking,
which aim to find the equilibrium between the encoder and the attacker, we
focus on two encoders, who, however, do not intentionally attack each other, but
rather compete with each other for maximizing their own embedding capacity.
We show that, when both players do not cooperate with each other, the optimal
response for each player, surprisingly, depends on his or her own distortion con-
straint. When they cooperate with each other, the equilibrium depends on the
side information shared between them. We have analyzed two different cases for
the cooperative game and provided the effective ways to find the equilibriums.
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